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Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can
Never Apply to NFL Clubs:
A Primer on Property-Rights Theory
in Professional Sports
Marc Edelman*
Over the past two decades, the National Football League
(“NFL”) has become one of America’s most profitable collection
of businesses.1 During this period the sum of NFL-club revenues
has expanded from just under $970 million per year in 1989 to
over $6.5 billion in 2008.2 NFL franchise values have also
skyrocketed, with many clubs now valued at over $700 million per
year.3

A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2758. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
*
Marc Edelman, Esq. (MarcEdelman@aol.com) is a Sports Law professor at both
New York Law School and Seton Hall University, as well as a Sports Law and
Economics professor at Manhattanville College. Mr. Edelman earned his B.S. in
Economics from the Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania) and his J.D./M.A.
from the University of Michigan.
1
See Don Walker, Longtime NFL Insider Goodell will Replace Tagliabue,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 2006, at C-Sports (“[Roger] Goodell is taking over an
operation to be the best-run and most-popular sport in the country”), available at 2006
WLNR 13770189; see also Kevin Paul Dupont, For Sports Franchises, the Loss Column
Grows, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 2003, at A1 (discussing how the NFL is the only
American professional sports league without imminent fiscal concerns); Tom Lowry, The
NFL Machine, BUS. WK., Jan. 27, 2003, at 87–94; Manny Topol, A Super Commish,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 2003, at F6 (discussing the superior business performance of the
NFL).
2
See Walker, supra note 1; see generally Lowry, supra note 1, at 89 (estimating NFL
revenue at $4.8 billion in 2004).
3
Walker, supra note 1.
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Clubs in the other three premier American sports leagues—
Major League Baseball (“MLB”), the National Basketball
Association (“NBA”) and the National Hockey League (“NHL”)—
have also experienced strong revenue growth during this period,
with the average rate-of-return for premier American sports clubs
outpacing the overall U.S. stock market.4 This strong growth rate
is based in part upon premier sports clubs’ unique property-rights
structure, which allocates certain property rights at the league
level, rather than at the club level.5
In July 2007, the Northern District of Illinois ruled in American
Needle Inc. v. New Orleans Saints that based on this unique
property-rights structure, NFL clubs are exempt from certain
aspects of § 1 of the Sherman Act, because “the NFL and the teams
act as a single entity in their licensing and intellectual property.”6
Since this ruling, other premier sports leagues have more broadly
proclaimed that “professional sports leagues are best considered
‘single entities’ under the antitrust laws” when assessing the
leagues’ business practices.7
4

See Richard G. Sheehan, Keeping Score: The Economics of Big-Time Sports, in THE
BUS. OF SPORTS 47, 47–49 (Scott R. Rosner & Kenneth L. Shropshire eds., 2004); see
also RODNEY D. FORT, SPORTS ECONOMICS 6 (Prentice Hall 2d. ed. 2006) (during the
1990s, club sale prices provided between 10.7 and 17.7 return on investment, depending
upon sport); Lowry, supra note 1, at 87–93; Topol, supra note 1, at F6; Walker, supra
note 2. For articles specifically related to MLB, see Chris Isidore, Baseball Close to
Catching NFL as Top $ Sport, CNNMONEY.COM (Oct. 25, 2007), available at
http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/25/commentary/sportsbiz (explaining that Major League
Baseball’s sales will surpass $6 billion for the first time in 2008, doubling the amount
from 2000, and that “[b]aseball’s sales have increased 50 percent from 2004 and have
doubled since 2000”); More Revenue for Major League Baseball, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 29, 2006, at 6 (discussing importance of MLB revenues exceeding
$6 billion for the first time); Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball’s Fortunes are Soaring in More
Ways than One, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 15, 2007, at 34.
5
See generally MICHAEL LEEDS & PETER VON ALLMEN, THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS §§
3.1–3.4 (2002).
6
496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2007). Unusually, the court in American Needle
based much of its holding on a single recent law review note. See id. (citing Nathaniel
Grow, There’s No “I” in ‘League’: Professional Sports Leagues and the Single Entity
Defense, 105 MICH. L. REV. 183 (2006)). Further, the law review note relies on a dubious
presumption that “there is minimal or nonexistent competition between franchises in a
professional sports league.” Grow, at 193.
7
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, at 1 (Oct. 13, 2007) (No.
07 Civ. 8455 (LAP)). The Southern District of New York has since rejected this
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As a matter of law and economics, courts should not find that
premier American sports clubs are “single entities,” exempt from §
1 of the Sherman Act.8 The Supreme Court defines “single
entities” as 100%, wholly-owned companies,”9 or, at a minimum,
companies with “complete unity of interest.”10 Leagues in the
premier American sports are not 100% wholly-owned companies,
nor do their constituent clubs have complete unity of interest.
Therefore, as many courts have already concluded, these clubs are
fully capable of conspiring with one another. 11
argument. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 Civ. 8455 (LAP), 2007 WL
3254421, slip op. at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (“The NHL is an unincorporated
association of thirty Member Clubs organized as a joint venture.”) (citation omitted).
8
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in the restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal.” 26 Stat. 209 (1890)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000)). However, the Supreme Court has
interpreted this statute to only illegalize those agreements that unreasonably restrain
trade. Standard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911). Classification as a “single entity”
means immunity under § 1 of the Sherman Act because it is impossible for an entity to
collude with itself. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA (Chicago Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593,
601 (7th Cir. 1996) (Cudahy, J. concurring).
9
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). “We
limit our inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.” Id. at
767.
10
Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court then goes on to define “complete unity of
interest” as occurring where the parties “objectives are common, not disparate,” as well
as where the conduct “deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of
decisionmaking that competition assumes.” Id. at 769, 771.
11
Many courts have rejected the single-entity defense in the scope of premier
American sports leagues. See, e.g., St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. NFL,
154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998); Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem’l
Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL,
720 F.2d 772 (3d. Cir. 1983); N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.
1982); Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 97 Civ 5184, 1998 WL 419765
(E.D. Pa. June 23, 1998); McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992); see
generally Chicago Bulls II, 95 F.3d at 599 (“Whether the NBA itself is more like a single
firm . . . or like a joint venture . . . is a tough question under Copperweld); Chi. Prof’l
Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA (Chicago Bulls I), 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 1992) (“For
now we treat the NBA as a joint venture, just as the parties do in the bulk of their
arguments”); MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO ET. AL, SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (2d
ed. 2007) (“Others perceive sports leagues and sports associations as types of joint
ventures in which the parties operate as a collective but retain considerable individual
entrepreneurial control.”); cf. Marc Edelman, Single Entity Ruling: ‘Needle’ in Haystack,
N.Y.L.J. 4, 12 (Jan. 2, 2008) (discussing the American Needle ruling as an anomaly)
[hereinafter Edelman, Single Entity Ruling].
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This article argues that as a matter of law and economics, clubs
in the four premier American sports leagues lack sufficient unity of
interest for any court to classify them as “single entities.” Part I of
this article discusses the contemporary law-and-economics theory
underlying the allocation of private and common property. Part II
explains the three different property-rights systems that have
emerged in American professional sports: (1) the pure privateproperty system (no unity of interest); (2) the pure commonproperty system (complete unity of interest); and (3) the mixedmode system (partial unity of interest). Part III describes the
contractual underpinnings of the mixed-mode property system, as
that system applies to the four premier American sports leagues.
Part IV analyzes the allocation of property rights in the mixedmode system and explains why sports clubs operating in that
system cannot form a “single-entity” league.
I. PRIVATE AND COMMON PROPERTY THEORY
The central tenet of capitalism is personal ownership of
property.12 Yet, even within capitalism, property owners often
debate how to best allocate personal property rights.13 In a
capitalist system, most property rights are held in private–either by
an individual, a family, or a company. Yet, other property rights
are held in common: for example, by communes, kibbutzim, or
cooperatives.
Supporters of private property rights point to the 1833
pamphlet by mathematician William Forster Lloyd, which explains

12
Property is a mixture of rights to use and exclude others from using. Chicago Bulls I,
961 F.2d at 670. The alternative to personal ownership is state ownership. See Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 135,
141 (Robert C. Ellickson, Carol M. Rose & Bruce A. Ackerman eds., 3d ed. 2002). In a
personal ownership system, “[a]n owner of property rights possesses the consent of
fellowmen to allow him to act in [a] particular way[].” Id. at 136.
13
A number of authors have pointed out there really are three different kinds of
personal property-private property, communal or jointly owned property, and “open
access.” See James M. Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine, in PERSPECTIVES OF
PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12, at 129, 133.

01_EDELMAN_031208_FINAL

2008]

3/12/2008 7:11:02 PM

PROPERTY-RIGHTS THEORY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

895

the failings of the common property system.14 In his pamphlet,
Lloyd explains that common property rights lead to overuse when
too many owners have access to a given resource and nobody has
the right to exclude others.15
Lloyd’s theory was later adopted by Garrett Hardin in his wellknown 1968 article, The Tragedy of the Commons.16 In that
article, Hardin explains the tragedy of common property in terms
of the perverse incentive to overuse.17 The incentive to overuse,
according to Hardin, comes from the notion that each user reaps
the full economic benefit from additional use; however, each user
only suffers a fraction of the associated cost.18

14
See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in PERSPECTIVES OF
PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12, at 119, 120.
15
See id.; see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY
LAW, supra note 12, at 159, 160.
16
See generally Hardin, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12.
17
See generally id.
18
Hardin explains:
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.
Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, “What is
the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?” This utility
has one negative and one positive component.
1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one
animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the
sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
2. The negative component is a function of the additional
overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the
effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the
negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is
only a fraction of -1.
3. Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational
herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to
pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and
another . . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and
every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the
tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to
increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited.
Id. at 120. In another renowned article, Harold Demsetz explains the same common
property problem as a difficulty ensuring that a transaction’s beneficiary also bears the
transaction’s cost. See Demsetz, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12, at
141.
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Similar to the “tragedy of the commons,” common-property
systems may also lead to the opposite problem, referred to by
Michael Heller as “the tragedy of the anticommons.”19 In this
tragedy, a resource is prone to under-use because multiple owners
each have a right to exclude others.20 Hence, no common owner
reaps any benefit.21
Despite these “tragedies,” many property-law scholars remain
enthusiastic about the prospects of common property systems as
enhancing group performance.22 For example, James Acheson, in
his article The Lobster Gangs of Maine, points to specific profitenhancing mechanisms of the Maine lobstermen’s common
property system.23 According to Acheson, under the Maine
arrangement, individual lobstermen choose to join “harbor gangs,”
which share common property amongst themselves.24 For these
“harbor gangs,” the value added by working collectively is that
members obtain valuable information about fishing locations and
innovations from one another.25 Members also assist one another
in times of emergency at sea.26
Today, property scholars continue to debate the conditions for
successful common property systems, recognizing that identical
arrangements do not best allocate property rights in all
circumstances. Ellickson, for example, has repeatedly suggested
that common ownership succeeds when business endeavors are
risky because common ownership allows pooling and sharing of
risk.27 Meanwhile, in the 1992 article Common Property,
Collective Action and Community, authors Sara Singleton and
19
Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 642
(1998); see also HELLER & EISENBERG, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note
12, at 160–61.
20
See Heller & Eisenberg, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12, at 161.
21
See id. An example of this tragedy occurred in post-Soviet economies, where
storefronts remained empty as salesmen continued to sell goods on the street because the
right to use storefronts was held in common by all citizens. See id.
22
See infra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
23
See Acheson, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12, at 129–34.
24
See id. at 133.
25
Id. at 130.
26
Id.
27
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra
note 12, at 146, 156.
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Michael Taylor suggest that common-property ownership succeeds
where there is appropriate restraint or regulation of use.28
According to Singleton and Taylor, proper restraint or regulation
could occur where four communal factors co-exist: shared beliefs
among owners; an ownership set that is more-or-less stable;
owners that expect to continue interacting; and direct, multiplex
communication.29
Conversely, factors adverse to common
property arrangements include differences amongst property
owners in wealth, income, race, ethnicity, religion, or class.30
Based on certain differences amongst these factors, in the context
of American professional sports, property-rights holders have
considered a wide array of allocation alternatives along the privateversus-common property spectrum.
II. THE THREE PROPERTY SYSTEMS IN AMERICAN SPORTS
From a general business perspective, there are three ways that
American professional sports could allocate property rights: (1) the
club-based private property system (no unity of interest); (2) the
league-based common property system (complete unity of
interest); and (3) the mixed-mode property system (partial unity of
interest).
A. Rise and Fall of the Club-Based Private Property System
The first system used to allocate property rights in American
sports was the club-based private property system.31 During this
early period, which lasted until the mid-1870s, all clubs were
privately owned, privately operated, and minimally cooperative

28

See Sara Singleton & Michael Taylor, Common Property, Collective Action and
Community, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 309, 310 (1992).
29
See id. at 315.
30
See id. at 316.
31
See Symposium, Panel III: Restructuring Professional Sports Leagues, 12 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 413, 419 (2002) [hereinafter Panel III] (“[O]riginally
sports in America, especially the team sports, started off as individual clubs.”) (citing
Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The Commissioner
and an Alternate Approach from a Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65, 66
(1995)); see also LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 93.
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with one another.32 Sports clubs played each other exclusively on
an informal basis, and visiting games occurred during long road
trips known as “grand tour[s].”33
Baseball was the most popular sport during this era, featuring
over 300 independent clubs. The nation’s best clubs drew large
crowds, as fans expected to see which undefeated clubs would
remain undefeated.34 During this era, players formed organizations
such as the National Association of Base Ball Players (“NABBP”),
which purported to standardize on-the-field rules.35
These
associations, however, neither enforced off-the-field rules nor
crowned a league champion.36
Within a short time, it became obvious that there were many
problems with the club-based private property system. For
example, because independent clubs contracted to play games
against rivals without any centralized oversight, each club played a
different length schedule, against a different set of opponents.37 As
a result, when a club such as the Cincinnati Red Stockings finished
its 1869 season with the remarkable record of 56 wins, 0 losses and
one tie, fans were left wondering if that club was really amongst
the best, or whether the club merely chose not compete against
high-caliber competition.38
One of the main impediments to fielding more baseball
contests during this era involved high transaction costs.39 In
addition to causing scheduling problems, high transaction costs
caused high club turnover, disagreement amongst clubs about how
to allocate game proceeds, a lacking of competitive balance, and a
rampant gambling problem among players and managers.40
Due to the severity of these problems, by the 1870s, the clubbased private property system, which featured entirely private
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

See generally LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 93.
See GERALD W. SCULLY, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF SPORTS 5 (1995).
See LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 93.
See SCULLY, supra note 33, at 5.
See id. at 5–6.
See id. at 6.
LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 93.
See SCULLY, supra note 33, at 6.
See id. at 7.
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property rights, was in a decline.41 A major blow to the system
came in 1876, when Chicago baseball promoter William Hubert
launched what most regarded as a superior baseball product:
National League baseball.42 Although the National League did not
initially reallocate many property rights, the emergence of even a
basic league structure encouraged clubs to cooperate with one
another.43 For example, one of the National League’s first
accomplishments was to establish a standardized playing
schedule.44 The National League also implemented a three-person
panel to resolve a narrow range of disputes amongst club owners.45
Then, in 1920 (seventeen years after the National League
unofficially merged with the American League),46 the National and
American Leagues jointly named Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis
as Major League Baseball’s first commissioner.47 By creating the
position of commissioner, ordained with broad authority to
investigate alleged wrongdoing and to punish any conduct
suspected as “detrimental to the best interests of the national game
of baseball,” Major League Baseball began to usher in a new
system of sports, marked by some central coordination of property
rights.48 Nevertheless, it is important to remember that “it was the
leagues that were created to direct the success of the individual
[clubs],” and not the other way around.49
41

See id. at 6–7.
See id.; see also Marc Edelman, Can Antitrust Law Save the Minnesota Twins? Why
Commissioner Selig’s Contraction Plan was Never a Sure Deal, 10 SPORTS LAW J. 45, 47
(2003) [hereinafter Edelman, Minnesota Twins].
43
See SCULLY, supra note 33, at 7–8, 12.
44
Cf. LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 93.
45
ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BEST INTERESTS OF BASEBALL? THE REVOLUTIONARY REIGN OF
BUD SELIG 22 (2006).
46
See Edelman, Minnesota Twins, supra note 42, at 47.
47
Jason M. Pollack, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner “Best Interests”
Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1646 (1999).
48
Id. (citing Major League Agreement §2(a)–(b), at 1 (1921)).
49
Panel III, supra note 31, at 420 (quoting Kenneth Shropshire); see also L.A. Mem’l
Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Even though the
individual clubs often act for the common good of the NFL, we must not lose sight of the
purpose of the NFL as stated in Article I of its constitution, which is to ‘promote and
foster the primary business of League members.’”); Daniel S. Mason, Revenue Sharing
and Agency Problems in Professional Team Sport: The Case of the National Football
League, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, 54, 55 (“[T]eams collectively hire a
42
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B. Rise and Fall of the League-Based Common Property System
On the opposite end of the spectrum, another property rights
system that emerged in American sports was the league-based
common property system, which began in the 1990s with the aid of
sophisticated lawyers.50 The league-based common property
system consists of a centrally-held league that holds all property
rights collectively.51
The most important example of this common property system
is the original model for Major League Soccer (“MLS”), which
was created in the early 1990s by then Latham & Watkins LLP
attorney Alan Rothenberg.52 Mr. Rothenberg envisioned MLS to
serve as a “single entity” league for purposes of an antitrust
advantage.53 At least in the business sector, this model seemed to
meet the Sherman Act’s test for “complete unity of interest.”54
The MLS model, as envisioned by Rothenberg, was intended to
serve as a league composed of “investor-operators” (rather than
club owners) financing and operating an entire soccer entity under
a single voice.55 These investors, according to Rothenberg’s
original plan, were to own shares of the league entity and sit on a
Board of Directors.56 The Board of Directors would then elect
commissioner to oversee League operations and to temper any disputes that may arise
among League stakeholders.”).
50
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 26; PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS,
SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 214–15, 566 (3d ed. 2004).
51
See Lacie Kaiser, The Flight from Single-Entity Structured Leagues, 2 DEPAUL J. OF
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2004) (explaining that centrally-held leagues have
“tried to centralize and control their respective sports by having the league own all teams,
hold all player and coaching contracts and pay those salaries, and maintain sponsorship
deals and broadcasting rights.”).
52
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 566; see also Alan I. Rothenberg—Profile,
FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/finance/mktguideapps/personinfo/FromPersonIdPerson
Tearsheet.jhtml?passedPersonId=939747 (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
53
See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 214, 566.
54
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984); see
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 214.
55
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 214. These club operators, who make the dayto-day business decisions for a single club, were awarded with a pro rata share of overall
league profits, rather than with the profits of that specific club. See id. at 566.
56
Id.; see also Kaiser, supra note 51, at 8–9 (“In 1995, Major League Soccer (MLS)
began its first season formed as a limited liability company under Delaware law. At first,
a board of governors of the MLS had centralized control over the league and all of its
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officers to run all of the clubs’ business operations in a unified
manner, centrally–setting prices for tickets, concessions, and
broadcasting, as well as hiring and assigning personnel.57
According to Rothenberg’s original plan, once the league paid its
corporate taxes, the remaining revenues would be reinvested into
the league, and any profits the league earned would be distributed
equally to league shareholders in the form of dividends.58 Thus, all
owners would earn an equal return per share, irrespective of each
clubs’ on-the-field performance—a factor completely unifying all
shareholders’ interests.59
At first glance, Rothenberg’s proposed common-property
system should have attracted strong investor interest. The
purported financial advantages of the MLS’s common property
system were based upon reducing shareholder risk. Specifically,
the league structure, as proposed by Rothenberg, would have
enjoyed lower operating expenses than other sports structures
based on the need for fewer front-office functional and
administrative employees.60
Nevertheless, MLS’s pure common-property system never
came into fruition, as most prospective shareholders were
disinterested in the proposed league structure.61 As a general
matter, wealthy investors did not want to become “faceless

teams. The board was to run all of the teams; handle all player contracts and allocation;
employ all coaches, general managers, and staff; and set prices for concessions,
broadcasts, merchandise, and tickets.”).
57
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 566.
58
See id. The MLS quickly abandoned this purely common-property model in favor of
an organization involving investor-operators, which played some role in determining the
day-to-day business decisions of a specific club and maintained some of the relevant
profits. Id. at 566–67.
59
See generally id. at 566.
60
See id.; see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 27 (“Beyond the advantages of
substantially reduced antitrust exposure and liability, the [common-property] league
should yield cost savings associated with reduced competition. . . . There also may be . . .
cost savings as a result of [the common-property league] being responsible for the
business operations of all the teams in the league.”).
61
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 17 (“On one hand, it is unlikely that most
team owners would be willing to trade their individual operating autonomy and the
historical, well-nurtured inter-franchise rivalries.”); WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50,
at 566.
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investors” in a sports corporation.62 Rather, they wanted the
chance to win championships.63 Because the pure commonproperty system did not produce champion owners, few were
interested in investing in MLS.64
Because of difficulty initially finding investors, MLS
eventually abandoned its pure common-property structure and
turned to a mixed-mode model.65 Ultimately, MLS chose a
property-rights system more to the liking of potential investors, but
where “‘complete unity of interest[]’”66 became “doubtful.”67 In
other words, the “single entity” structure was cast aside.68
Since then, only a few start-up sports businesses have
attempted to revive the pure common-property system. In 20002001, World Wrestling Entertainment (“WWE”) attempted to form
a common-property league when it launched a new professional
football league called the XFL, of which 75 percent of the league
was owned by the publicly-traded WWE; however, the XFL folded
62

WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 566.
See id.; see also Panel III, supra note 31, at 424 (“Most problematic for the singleentity structure is figuring out how to tell the large-ego set of owners that this league is
going to be a little bit different and that as a single entity, one of the owners, like George
Steinbrenner or Jerry Buss, will not have the opportunity to be out front in the same
manner that previous leagues have had individual owners out front.”) (quoting Kenneth
Shropshire).
64
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 22 (“By permitting individual owners to run
the local business operations of their teams, the major sports leagues have been able to
attract wealthy entrepreneurs who are capable of operating their individual teams, while,
at the same time, providing experience, oversight, and expertise to the overall league
operations.”) (citations omitted); WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 567 (explaining
that “in the end, MLS had to make a radical change to give [potential owner Robert]
Kraft, for example, special status as ‘investor operator’ of the New England Revolution,
wielding much the same control over this club as his Patriots.”).
65
See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 566–67.
66
Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)).
67
Fraser, 284 F.3d at 58–59 (“To sum up, the present case is not Copperweld but
presents a more doubtful situation; MLS and its operator/investors comprise a hybrid
arrangement, somewhere between a single company (with or without wholly owned
subsidiaries) and a cooperative arrangement between existing competitors. . . . The case
for expanding Copperweld is debatable and, more so, the case for applying the single
entity label to MLS.”); see also Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
68
See Kaiser, supra note 51, at 1–2 (explaining that the MLS has since “moved
towards the more traditional structure of individually owned teams with a league office to
oversee those teams”).
63
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after just one season.69 Also in 2001, the Major Indoor Soccer
League (“MISL”) launched itself as a single-entity indoor soccer
league based on a system of common property rights.70 The MISL
has proven more successful than the XFL, having just recently
signed a multiyear television deal with the Fox Soccer Channel.71
Only time will tell if the MISL keeps its single-entity structure.72
C. Mixed-Mode Property System: A Superior Sports Alternative
Given that the private-property system has led to sub-optimally
low levels of cooperation, and the common-property system has
struggled to lure investors, most sports businesses have converged
upon a middle-ground solution that includes both private and
commonly-held property rights.73
This new approach, in
economics terms, is best described as a “mixed-mode” system. 74
It is a middle-ground system of allocating property rights, and it is
69

See Langdon Brockinton, Selling Market on New Property a Challenge; XFL Half
Way There, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Dec. 4, 2000, at 3; see also Marc
Edelman, Fan Ownership can Give UFL a Leg up on Building Loyalty, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Aug. 27, 2007, at 28 [hereinafter Edelman, Fan Ownership]; Jon
Show, WWE Busy Scripting its Next Moves, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 9,
2006, at 28.
70
See One on One with Steve Ryan, Major Indoor Soccer League Commissioner,
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Feb. 9, 2004, at 42; David Sweet, TV Deal Key to
Indoor Soccer Goal of Becoming Fifth Major League, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J.,
Mar. 18, 2002, at 22.
71
See Colin Stephenson, Indoor Soccer Team Set to Play in Prudential Center, THE
STAR-LEDGER, June 20, 2007, at 59, available at 2007 WLNR 11564594 (“Asked why he
chose to add a soccer team to the 17,500-seat arena’s list of tenants, [New Jersey Devils
owner Jeff] Vanderbeek said he thinks the league’s financial model [a single-entity
ownership structure with a $350,000 salary cap per team] will make it possible to turn a
profit. He also said he simply liked the game, and thought it would be a good fit for the
area.”); see also Dancy Named Sharks Head Coach, ORLANDO BUS. J., Sept. 25, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 18790693; Terry Lefton, Puma to Make Balls for MISL,
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at 8; Major Indoor Soccer League,
HOOVERS COMPANY IN-DEPTH REPS., Mar. 28, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 5843454;
MISL Signs TV Deal, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 15, 2007, at 7.
72
The author of this article was affiliated with the MISL during the summer of 2001.
73
COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11 (stating that sports leagues operate as a joint
venture but retain considerable individual control).
74
See Richard C. Levin et al., The Report of the Independent Members of the
Commissioner’s Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS,
supra note 4, 62, 64 (“[S]ports leagues are blends of cooperation and competition—
cooperation for the sake of producing satisfactory competitiveness.”).
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the system currently in place by all four of the premier American
sports leagues.75
From a strategic perspective, a mixed-mode property system is
composed of individual club owners that recognize some
cooperation amongst clubs is needed to produce a saleable
output.76 For example, all clubs in the mixed-mode system accept
the need to maintain at least one viable opponent,77 and all clubs
want to maintain at least minimal leveling of on-the-field
competition.78 In addition, although each club in the mixed-mode
system generally prefers to win, no club wants to always beat its
opponents.79 This is a critical distinction, as clubs in the mixedmode system understand that fans do not want to attend a
seemingly pre-determined contest.80
At the same time, however, clubs in the mixed-mode system
still seek to maintain some independent property rights apart from
any central planning.81 Because the interests of individual clubs
75

See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 19–25. For this reason, one of the leading
treatises on sports law refers to the mixed-mode property system simply as the
“traditional model.” Id.
76
PAUL DOWNWARD & ALISTAIR DAWSON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL CLUB
SPORTS 20 (2000); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11 (“Unlike individual
sports events, which may survive on their own, teams in most league sports, excepting, of
course, barnstorming operations such as the Harlem Globetrotters, need a league or some
sort of contractual relationship with other teams to exist.”).
77
E.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251 (2d Cir. 1982) (“No single
owner could engage in professional football for profit without at least one other
competing team.”); see also DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 76, at 20.
78
See DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 77, at 21 (citation omitted).
79
See id. at 20; see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11 (“One aspect of this
business cooperation is an effort to control the economic competition among the teams to
ensure that there will be some degree of parity.”).
80
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11; DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 76,
at 25; see generally John Lombardo, XFL Revamps Strategy as Ratings Dive, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 5, 2001, at 4 (explaining that unlike in World Wrestling
Entertainment, the owners of the XFL cannot script game action).
81
See Chicago Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The teams are not the
league’s subsidiaries; they have separate ownership.”); COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11,
at 11 (“In some respects these leagues and associations are not unlike large cartels (such
as OPEC), having a common goal and objective that is best obtained through collective
efforts, yet resulting in individual gains not necessarily shared with other members of the
cartel.”) (citations omitted); see also Complaint for Injunction Relief at ¶ 12 Madison
Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 Civ. 8455 (Sept. 28, 2007) (“Over the years, MSG
has developed, reinforced and encouraged fan interest in the Rangers, making substantial
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are not identically aligned, clubs in larger markets generally prefer
to keep more private property;82 whereas clubs in the smaller
markets generally prefer more collectivization.83 Nevertheless, all
clubs in the mixed-mode system recognize an ultimate need to
balance these two preferences.
As a result, a dimorphic property-rights structure emerges in
the mixed-mode commons, equipped with tightened controls on
clubs in comparison to the private-property model, as well as a
greater emphasis on controls that are enforced by the clubs acting
jointly.84 This innovative structure is facilitated by the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) mandate that the league overall
serve as the exclusive bargaining unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining.85
III. CONTRACTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE MIXED-MODE
PROPERTY SYSTEM
The relationship between clubs in the mixed-mode property
system is set forth by two important agreements: (1) the league
constitution (or league agreement), which sets forth the
investments in the Rangers franchise as it seeks to compete with other NHL teams,
including but not limited to the two other NHL teams in the New York metropolitan
area.”) (emphasis added).
82
See DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 76, at 37–38; see also Ken Rosenthal,
Angelos’ Game Plan Puts Owners in the Ballpark, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July 28, 1994,
at 1C (explaining that Peter “Angelos [owner of MLB’s Baltimore Orioles] opposes
revenue sharing because it would shift some of the Orioles’ profits to teams generating
less revenues—in effect, penalizing his club for achieving financial success”); Vito
Stellino, Cowboys’ Jones Wins Again; Revenue Sharing Remains Unchanged, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 10, 1996, at 10C (discussing the NFL’s Dallas Cowboys’
opposition to significant revenue sharing).
83
See DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 75, at 37–38; see also Jack O’Connell,
Following his Lead: Selig has Skippered Sport through Changes, Strike, THE HARTFORD
COURANT, Mar. 31, 2002, at L2.
84
See generally COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11–12, 23 (discussing these
compromises and the increased economic interdependence of clubs in the modern
model); cf. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1984)
(“NFL policies are not set by one individual or parent corporation, but by the separate
teams acting jointly.”).
85
See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that the NLRB did not err in determining that the appropriate bargaining unit was the
league overall).
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relationship between individual clubs, and (2) the collective
bargaining agreement, which sets forth the relationship between
clubs and the players union.86 Pursuant to these two contracts,
clubs in the mixed-mode system hire a league commissioner to
oversee and coordinate certain collective behavior among the
clubs, as well as institute detailed rules governing the entry and
exit of clubs from the league.87
A. The Commissioner
The league commissioner is a central administrator whose
broad-based responsibility in overseeing the behavior of
independent competitors serves as “an ‘exception,’ an ‘anomaly,’
and an ‘aberration’”88 within the more generalized world of
In pro sports, the commissioner is
American business.89
responsible for overseeing the collective conduct of sports clubs;
yet, according to most courts, the commissioner is autonomous,
rather than an agent of any given club.90
The commissioner has great power to help align the financial
interests of individual clubs by enforcing general financial rules,
86

See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11 (“Most leagues are coalesced by some
type of multi-team agreement in which each member agrees to observe a common set of
by-laws and/or constitutional provisions. In essence, the wax that binds the members is a
form of contract in which all teams agree to defer to the rules of the league as a whole.”);
see also L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1387 (“How the NFL is organized
and the nature and extent of cooperation among the member clubs is a matter of record;
the NFL Constitution and Bylaws contain the agreement.”).
87
See Pollack, supra note 47, at 1647–49, 1676; see generally COZZILIO ET AL., supra
note 11, at 11 (explaining the role of league bylaws).
88
Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 536 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing Flood v. Kuhn 407
U.S. 258, 282 (1972)).
89
Id. at 537 (7th Cir. 1978) (“In no other . . . business is there quite the same system,
created for quite the same reasons and with quite the same underlying policies.”); see
generally Pollack, supra note 47, at 1647–48.
90
See, e.g., Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 919 (1989) (“Whatever other activity
the Commissioner may be authorized to perform as an agent on behalf of Major League
Baseball, it is clear that with regard to disciplinary matters, the major league baseball
clubs have made the Commissioner totally independent of their control. Under the Major
League Agreement, the Commissioner’s status with respect to disciplinary matters is
analogous to that of an independent contractor . . . independent of any control by the
members of Major League Baseball.”). But cf. Prof’l Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey
Ass’n, 143 Cal. App. 3d 410, 415–16 (1983) (applying a fiduciary duty to club owners
that sit on the Board of Trustees of a league).
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such as asset-to-liability rules.91 The commissioner also plays an
important role in helping to unify sports clubs regarding nonfinancial issues.92 For example, early in the history of the mixedmode system, the commissioner helped to implement standardized
rules to promote player safety and welfare, such as the requirement
that baseball, football, and now hockey players wear helmets.93
More recently, the commissioner has helped to establish
standardized drug-testing policies, as well as other general rules
related to player and club decorum.94
B. Limited Entry of New Clubs
In terms of defining the rules of new membership, the mixedmode property system allows only a limited number of new clubs
to join each league—a feature that requires individual club voting
to determine potential league expansion.95 From an economics
perspective, admitting new clubs into an established league has
both a positive and negative effects on existing members.96 For
existing clubs, the advantage of new entry is that the new entrants
must pay an admission fee to each of the existing clubs.97 The
amount of this fee may include a substantial premium above the
current estimated mean franchise value. For example, in 2000, the
Houston Texans paid $700 million to join the NFL, even though
the highest sale price of an existing NFL franchise at that time was
just $635 million.98

91

For example, in 1982, MLB clubs owners introduced the “60/40 rule,” which states
that a MLB club must maintain a ratio of assets and liabilities of at least 60 to 40; the
MLB commissioner is responsible for enforcing that rule. Andrew Zimbalist, MLB’s
Debt Rule Reveals More Smoke and Mirrors, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., May 3,
2004, at 27; MLB CONST., art. XI, § 1 (amend. 2005) (addressing Fiscal Responsibility
[hereinafter MLB CONST.].
92
See generally WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 30–32.
93
See LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 96.
94
See generally WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 49–51.
95
See generally L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir.
1984) (explaining these type of league policies are not set by one parent club but rather
“by the separate teams acting jointly”).
96
LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 102–03.
97
Id. at 103.
98
See John McClain, Capers Likely Texans’ Choice: First Coach could be Named
Soon, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 18, 2001, at 1; see also FORT, supra note 4, at 7
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The negative aspect of new entry is that new entry leads to the
need to allocate risk among more parties.99 Also, in leagues that
share significant revenues, entrance of new, financially unstable
clubs could seriously undermine the stability of the league as a
whole.100
Because the mixed-mode system is really nothing more than a
loosely-aligned union of clubs, entry of any new club into an
existing league requires the vote of existing club owners. MLB,
for example, requires “[t]he vote of three-fourths of the Major
League Clubs . . . for the approval of . . . expansion by the addition
of a new Club or Clubs.”101 Although in most other contexts MLB
votes are decided by a mere majority, MLB enforces a heightened
voting standard in the context of entry, because MLB clubs
recognize the need to be extra careful; this ensures new clubs are
reputable.102
When clubs vote on entry, existing clubs consider various
factors about who to select as new ownership. Clubs always seek
to exclude buyers that lack financial resources to amply invest in
(mentioning that the New York Jets set an NFL record price when the club was sold in
2000 for $635 million).
99
Cf. COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 24.
100
See id. (“A collateral business concern faced . . . concerns the situation of a member
club whose owner is in severe financial distress, whether that distress is caused by the
club’s performance or unrelated financial problems. The business of the team may be
severely disrupted as the owner seeks a solution to his or her financial problems.”);
Richard Alm, Big Chill Ahead in the NHL?, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 1, 2003,
at 1B; see generally Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3rd. Cir. 1983)
(Memphis Grizzlies football franchise in the defunct World Football League
unsuccessfully sued for entrance into the NFL). Note, however, that other, less legitimate
reasons for steep entry fees may stem from purported advantages to keeping the number
of teams in the league below the market rate to ensure premium pricing on franchise
sales, as well a local government funding for new stadiums. See Marc Edelman, How to
Curb Professional Sports’ Bargaining Power Vis-à-Vis the American City, VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 280, 290 (2003) (“Modern sports leagues maintain excessive demand by
keeping a supply of viable host cities on hold so that current host cities, absent long-term
agreements with teams, are always in the position of having to accept a team owners’
demands or else risk losing that team.”) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Edelman,
Curb Bargaining Power].
101
MLB CONST., art. V, § 2(b)–2(b)(1).
102
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 24 (“[E]very member club may be adversely
affected by commercial and public relations errors committed by a single member
club.”).
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their clubs, as well as buyers with controversial character traits.103
On occasion, leagues have also sought to exclude sales to
prospective owners for less socially acceptable reasons, such as
their ethnicity or sociopolitical views.104
Finally, of note, among the four premier American sports
leagues, NFL clubs impose the strictest restrictions on potential
new ownership. In addition to excluding certain prospective
owners based on financial resources and character traits, the NFL
also seeks to prevent the sale of clubs to corporate buyers and
public buyers (with a special exception for the Green Bay
Packers).105 The NFL also has sought to forbid any ownership
structure where the primary investor in a club would own less than
51% of that club, as well as any cross-ownership arrangement
where the primary investor would own an interest in another sports
team.106 This last league rule has been found unlawful in at least
one instance; however, it has not been removed from the league
bylaws.107
C. Potential for Exit of Existing Clubs
Beyond governing entry, mixed-mode sports leagues also
establish rules governing club exit.108 One way that leagues
govern exit is by requiring an affirmative vote among clubs before
103

Cf. Piazza and Tirendi v. MLB, 831 F.Supp. 420, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
In the early 1990s, two prospective buyers of the San Francisco Giants contended
that the MLB denied their bid to purchase a baseball club based on their Italian-American
heritage. See id. at 422–23. Similarly, world-famous baseball owner Bill Veeck contends
that in 1944 he was denied the opportunity to purchase the Philadelphia Phillies baseball
club because he intended to break the race barrier in baseball, stocking the club entirely
with African-American players. BILL VEECK & ED LINN, VEECK AS IN WRECK 171–72
(Univ. Chi. Press 2001).
105
See Packers.com, Team: Executive Committee, http://www.packers.com/team/
executive_committee (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) (“[T]he Green Bay Packers are a team
and an organization unique in both structure and accomplishment. They represent—from
an organizational standpoint—the only publicly owned franchise in the 32-team NFL.”);
see also Daniel Kaplan, Fight League Going Public in Reverse Merger, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Sept. 18, 2006, at 6 (referring to the Green Bay Packers as the
only publicly owned sports club).
106
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 16; Mason, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS,
supra note 4, at 57.
107
See N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1262 (2d Cir. 1981).
108
See infra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
104
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any club may be sold, as well as requiring a vote before any club
may relocate or disband.109 For example, the MLB Constitution
states that “[a] Major League Club may withdraw from [MLB]
only with the approval of three-fourths of all Major League Clubs,
subject to such terms and conditions as the Commissioner may
require.”110 According to at least one court opinion, however,
sports clubs, despite contrary wording in certain league
agreements, always have the right to secede.111
In addition to “voluntary exit,” leagues also retain the
contractual right to terminate a club’s membership involuntarily if
a club violates an important league rule. The MLB Constitution,
for example, includes a separate section pertaining to “involuntary
termination,” which allows “with the approval of three-fourths of
all Major League Clubs” for MLB to terminate the membership of
any other club.112 Pursuant to the MLB Constitution, there are
twelve types of wrongful conduct that would allow MLB clubs to
involuntarily terminate another club, including the following
examples: “allow[ing] gambling of any kind upon its grounds,”113
“fail[ing] or refus[ing] to comply with any requirement of the
Commissioner,”114 and “[f]ail[ing] or refus[ing] to fulfill [their]
contractual obligations.”115
Given the possibility of clubs involuntarily terminating one
another, as well as the possibility of clubs seceding, the mixedmode system operates very differently from the league-based
common property system. Because clubs retain at least a limited
right to leave the league, as well as a right to require others to
leave, club interests are not intertwined with one another in any
complete way.

109

See, e.g., Jon Morgan, Modell Agrees to Sell Ravens, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 20,
1999, at 1A; MLB CONST., art. V, § 2(b)(2), (3), (8).
110
MLB CONST., art. VIII, § 3.
111
Chicago Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Yet, the 29 clubs, unlike GM’s
plants, have the right to secede . . . and rearrange into two or three leagues.”).
112
MLB CONST., art. VIII, § 4.
113
Id. § 4(c).
114
Id. § 4(f).
115
Id. § 4(j).
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IV. ALLOCATING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE MIXED-MODE SYSTEM
Based upon the contractual underpinnings of the mixed-mode
system, the clubs in this system choose to share certain property
rights at the league level, while maintaining other property rights
privately at the club level.116 Sports clubs balance between these
two interests along five different revenue streams: (1) individual
gate receipts and other fan-related revenues; (2) corporate
proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees;
and (5) Internet/new media revenues.117
A. Mixed-Mode Allocation of Gate Receipts and Other Stadium
Revenues
The property right to gate receipts and other fan-related
revenues (e.g., parking and concession sales) is the right to the
money fans pay to attend a sporting event. Mathematically, gate
receipts are equal to game attendance multiplied by average ticket
price.118 In today’s economy, gate receipts represent slightly less
than 40 percent of overall sports league revenues.119
Historically, gate receipts have been allocated in various ways,
even within a single league structure.120 For example, when the
National League was founded in 1876, home clubs retained all of
116
See Levin et al., in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 67–68 (discussing the
sources of revenue).
117
LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 73 (mentioning all of the revenue streams
except for Internet/new media).
118
Quantitatively the simplest equation for calculating gate revenues is Rg = p*q, where
Rg represents “gate revenues,” p represents “average price per ticket” and q represents
“quantity of tickets sold.” Id. at 75. However, the true cost of “gate receipts” also
includes the cost of parking. See Bring $12 to Park, or Buy in Advance, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at 22 (discussing the decision of MLB’s Atlanta
Braves to increase the cost of parking to $12 per car).
119
According to Financial World, for the 1996 season, gate receipts on average
represented 39.93% of a sports clubs’ revenue in the four premier American sports
leagues. LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 74 (citing Michael K. Ozanian,
Scoreboard Valuation, FINANCIAL WORLD, June 17, 1997 at 46–50). Meanwhile, more
recently, a Sports Business Journal article reported that for the 2005 season, MLB clubs
earned $1.8 billion of their $4.8 billion in revenues from gate receipts (37.5% of total
revenues). Eric Fisher, MLB Season Preview: Bud Selig Leads MLB’s Revenue Rally,
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Apr. 3, 2006, at 1, 23–27.
120
See infra notes 121–27 and accompanying text.
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their gate receipts as a form of private property.121 A few years
later, NL clubs agreed to reallocate gate receipts, granting only 70
percent of these proceeds to the home club, and allocating 30
percent to the visiting club.122 By 1950, National League clubs
had again voted to change how it allocated gate receipts, this time
with the home club’s revenue increased to 86 percent and the
visiting club’s revenue reduced to 14 percent.123 This approach
increased the home club’s incentive to attract new fans and
improve the condition of its ballpark.124 Today, MLB still
considers gate receipts as a form of local revenue; however, 34
percent of gate receipts are now shared equally amongst all
clubs.125
Other sports leagues have chosen to implement different
allocations of gate receipts. The NFL, for example, traditionally
allocates gate receipts more evenly, with approximately 60 percent
designated for the home club and approximately 40 percent placed
in a “visitor’s” pool, which is split equally among all clubs.126
Meanwhile, the NBA and NHL clubs allocate regular-season gate
receipts as entirely private property, belonging completely to the
home club.127
Although each of the premier American sports leagues allocate
gate receipts in a somewhat different manner, the way in which
each of these leagues allocate gate receipts indicates lack of
121

See generally SCULLY, supra note 33, at 11.
See id. With the implementation of revenue sharing of gate receipts, the new gate
revenue equation for a respective club became: Rg = ά * Rh + (1- ά) * Ra, where Rg
represents gate revenues, Rh represents average revenue from home games, Ra represents
average revenue from away games and ά represents the revenue share retained by the
home club. See LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 75.
123
See SCULLY, supra note 33, at 11.
124
See id.
125
See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL BASIC AGREEMENT, art. XXIV (2003–06) (The
Revenue Sharing Plan).
126
See Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1983); N. Am. Soccer
League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1252 (2d Cir. 1982); LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note
5, at 80; Lowry, supra note 1, at 111.
127
See DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 76, at 48; Mason, in THE BUSINESS OF
SPORTS, supra note 4, at 57; Sheehan, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 48.
Nevertheless, in both the NBA and NHL, gate receipts from post-season games are
shared amongst clubs. See John Lombardo, Leagues Cut into Clubs’ Final Revenues,
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., June 12, 2006, at 3.
122
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“complete unity of interest” amongst clubs in this area of
operation.128 For example, in the NFL, even though the New York
Giants football club earns money when consumers attended any
NFL game, the New York Giants earn even more money when
consumers attend New York Giants games rather than the games of
a rival club (for example, the New York Jets, or even a club in a
different city).129 As a result, even though each sports club has a
strong interest in promoting the overall league, each club has an
even greater interest in first promoting itself, even at the expense
of rival league-members.130
B. Mixed-Mode Allocation of Corporate Proceeds
A second stream of sports rights are corporate proceeds.
Corporate proceeds include local sponsorship agreements
(including naming rights agreements) and luxury suites.
1. Local Sponsorship/Naming Rights Agreements
Local sponsorship and naming rights agreements are long-term
corporate arrangements under which a sports club promises to
name either a stadium/arena or a specific part of a stadium/arena
after a sponsoring company, or where a club agrees to help market
a particular product more generally.131 Local sponsorship and
128

Copperweld Corp v. Independent Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
For discussion of clubs in the same league competing against one another for gate
receipts when those clubs are in close proximity to one another, see N. Am. Soccer
League, 670 F.2d at 1258 (mentioning this competition between NFL clubs for fans at
least where there are two or more teams located within a home territory) and Mid-South
Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787 (noting that “[c]onceivably within certain geographic
submarkets two league members compete with one another for ticket buyers.”). For
discussion of fans purchasing tickets for a sporting contest located outside of their
particular geographic region, signaling perhaps a wider competition amongst sports clubs
for gate receipts, see Growing Pains for Online Ticketing, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS
BUS. J., Oct. 29, 2007, at 6 (quoting online ticketing company Paciolan’s CEO Dave
Butler about the importance of online ticketing options to meet more than just the needs
of “a very limited geographic area.”).
130
See generally Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1098 (1st Cir. 1994) (describing intraleague competition within finite geographic markets); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v.
NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984) (mentioning independent NFL management
policies exist at the club level regarding “ticket prices”); Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at
787 (describing intra-league competition within finite geographic markets).
131
See generally LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5 at 81.
129
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naming rights have become especially popular in recent years
among certain types of companies (banks, utilities and packaged
goods companies), which seek to build brand equity amongst
sports fans by associating themselves with a given team.132 While
minor-league stadium naming rights may sell for as little as $2
million per year, and simple sponsorship agreements may sell for
even less,133 the market price for naming rights in premier
American sports stadiums is substantially higher and rising
exponentially.134 For example, just four years ago, the most
lucrative naming rights agreement was the Fed Ex sponsorship
agreement of the Washington Redskins football stadium, which
Fed Ex signed for a 29-year period at a price of $200 million ($6.9
million per year).135 In 2007, however, MLB’s New York Mets
signed a 20-year $400 million naming rights agreement with
Citigroup, granting Citigroup naming rights to the New York
Mets’ new stadium ($20.0 million per year); the NBA’s New
Jersey Nets signed a similar agreement with the London-based
financial institution Barklays PLC for naming rights to the Nets’
new Brooklyn, NY arena ($20.0 million per year).136
As with gate receipts, in the context of local sponsorship and
naming rights agreements, individual clubs lack “complete unity of
interest.”137 The market for both sponsorships and stadium naming
rights is national (if not international), and clubs actively compete
against one another to obtain the most profitable of these
agreements.138 Because clubs almost always keep as private
132

See Jon Morgan, Familiar Names Popping Up on Stadiums, THE BALTIMORE SUN,
Feb. 17, 2003, at 1D.
133
Examples of simple sponsorship rights include for example Anheuser-Busch’s
agreement to sponsor the Arizona Cardinals football stadium, under which AnheuserBusch gets permanent electronic signs in the stadium, and Heinz’s agreement where it
pays to place two 35 foot-long ketchup bottle icons on the scoreboard. See, e.g., Terry
Lefton, Anheuser-Busch Takes Big Role in Cardinals’ New Football Stadium, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 20, 2006, at 9.
134
See LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 81.
135
Id.
136
Terry Lefton, CAA Hired to Land Sponsors for the Yankees, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 1, 2007, at 1; John Lombardo, Barklays-Nets: A Brand Grows in
Brooklyn, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Jan. 22, 2007, at 1.
137
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
138
See, e.g., Eric Fisher, Mets Ask $10M a Year to Name New Ballpark, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at 4 (discussing how Mets owner Jeff Wilpon
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property the profit they derive from these agreements, clubs
compete vigorously, sometimes even against clubs within their
league.
The competition is especially intense for full
stadium/arena naming rights because corporations generally do not
purchase naming rights for more than one stadium/arena.
2. Luxury Suites
Luxury suites, meanwhile, provide corporate fans with a
premium game experience.139 Equipped with food, televisions,
and premium services, luxury suites allow clubs to receive up-front
revenues from corporate clients on an annual basis, irrespective of
the clubs’ on-the-field performance.140 Clubs are increasingly
demanding that cities provide them with new stadiums/arenas,
equipped with 50 to 100 luxury suites.141 These suites are in turn
sold to corporate clients for upwards of $100,000 per season.142
For example, at San Diego’s PETCO Park, Padres management
initially sold luxury suites to corporate sponsors at a one-time
$90,000 membership fee, plus $160,000 in annual rent.143
Meanwhile, at the Staples Center, which hosts the NBA’s Los
believes that if the Yankees were to sell naming rights, the Mets and Yankees would be
in competition for sponsors); Don Muret, Naming Rights Shoppers Want to Know Where
A’s Park Will Be, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at 14 (explaining that
the city and exact location of a new ballpark affects how much a corporation is willing to
pay to put its name on a specific stadium, and implying that individual clubs compete
with one another to reach naming rights agreements with those major corporations).
139
LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 81. When a club sells a luxury box, it first
assigns a gate value to the luxury box ticket and treats that portion of the proceeds as part
of gate revenues. Id. After subtracting out the gate value, the remainder value of the
luxury box ticket is what is considered as the revenues derived from the luxury box. Id.
140
See generally id.
141
See Edelman, Curb Bargaining Power, supra note 100, at 280–82 (2003). Cities that
provide stadiums to clubs, however, sometimes then share the revenue derived from those
boxes; for example, the New York Mets share 50 percent of the revenue from Shea
Stadium’s luxury boxes with the city. See Eric Fisher, supra note 138, at 4.
142
See John Lombardo, Knicks’ Premium Seats Carry Steepest Price, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 29, 2007, at 4 [hereinafter Knicks]; John Lombardo, Pistons
Selling Newest Suites at Lower Prices, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 6, 2006,
at 4 [hereinafter Pistons]; Don Muret, AEG Print Ads Tout Staples Premium Seats,
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 15, 2007, at 5.
143
See Jonathan Heller, San Diego Baseball Team Markets Ballpark Luxury, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Dec. 13, 2002, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5553/
is_200212/ai_n21722523.
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Angeles Lakers and Los Angeles Clippers, luxury suites sell for an
annual price of up to $400,000 per year,144 and at Madison Square
Garden, which hosts the NBA’s New York Knicks and the NHL’s
New York Rangers, “VIP boxes,” which are similar to luxury
suites, sell for up to $800,000 per year.145
Revenues from luxury suites in all four premier American
sports leagues remain primarily private property, indicating
interests amongst the clubs to compete against one another in the
sale of these boxes.146 The competition amongst clubs for luxury
boxes is very similar to that for gate receipts, except luxury box
competition is arguably even more intense because individual
clubs keep all (rather than part) of their luxury suite revenues.147
This again indicates lack of any “complete unity of interest.”148
C. Mixed-Mode Allocation of Television/Radio Broadcast
Revenues
A third important property right is television/radio broadcast
revenues.149 On a league-wide basis, television broadcast revenues
range from as high as $2.4 billion per year in the NFL to

144

See Don Muret, supra note 142, at 5.
See Knicks, supra note 142, at 4.
146
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note, 11 at 13.
147
See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984)
(mentioning independent NFL management policies exist at the club level regarding
“luxury box seats”); cf. Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1983)
(discussing competition amongst sports clubs for certain local revenues).
148
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
149
See generally LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 4, at 77. Radio broadcast rights
represent only a small percentage of total broadcast dollars. See PHIL SCHAAF, SPORTS
MARKETING: IT’S NOT JUST A GAME ANYMORE 203–04 (1995). Radio broadcast fees,
which are not addressed further in this article, are usually negotiated on the club level.
See generally id. Amongst MLB clubs, the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox
have the most lucrative radio agreements, valued at $10–$12 million per year. See Andy
Grossman, Red Sox Seek MLB’s Largest Radio Rights Deal, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS
BUS. J., Mar. 13, 2006, at 7. But in the NFL, as of 1994, the Chicago Bears had the most
lucrative radio rights deal at $4.5 million/year. Id. (citation omitted). In addition, many
sports clubs are buying radio stations to avoid what they consider unprofitable radio
deals. See id. at 7; Andy Grossman, Radio Executives Worry Over Trend of Sports Teams
Buying Stations, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Feb. 20, 2006, at 13. This mimics a
longer-standing trend amongst a growing number of sports clubs to start their own cable
television networks.
145

01_EDELMAN_031208_FINAL

2008]

3/12/2008 7:11:02 PM

PROPERTY-RIGHTS THEORY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

917

substantially less in other leagues, such as the NHL.150 These
revenues are composed of both national and local payments. In
each of the four premier American sports leagues, local broadcast
revenues are regarded as private property; whereas, national
broadcast revenues are held in common and allocated evenly
amongst the clubs.
Each of the four premier American sports leagues has adopted
a different mix between nationally-broadcasted and locallyavailable games. At one extreme, in the NFL, clubs sell all nonpreseason television rights on a collectivized, national basis.151 At
the other extreme, leagues such as MLB and the NHL permit
individual clubs to negotiate the sale of most games to local
networks.152
In the early days of television, member clubs in each of the
four premier American leagues were undecided about whether to
collectivize any broadcast rights, with some large market clubs
seeming to prefer signing only local television contracts.153 The
movement in favor of collectivizing at least some television rights
began with the NBA packaging and selling of broadcast rights.154
MLB then followed with “Game of the Week,”155 and by 1961
150

See FORT, supra note 4, at 79–81; LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 77; Andy
Bernstein, Networks Talk Tough on MLB TV Package, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J.,
Apr. 10, 2006, at 3. On average, the revenue in MLB, the NBA, the NHL and the NFL
from various media sources surpassed gate revenues in 1997, accounting for 39 percent
of total club revenues. See Sports Club Valuations, FORBES, Dec. 13, 1998 at 132; see
also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11; DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 76, at
37. In 2006, total MLB common media revenues, just from national broadcasts, was
estimated at $814 million, with 51.2% of this national broadcast revenue coming from
broadcast television contracts and 36.5% coming from a cable television contracts. See
Eric Fisher, supra note 119, at 1, 23–27.
151
DENNIS R. HOWARD & JOHN L. CROMPTON, FINANCING SPORT 401 (2d ed. 2004).
152
See FSN Hooks Marlins for All Telecasts, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Feb.
27, 2006, at 7 (stating that the Florida Marlins sell 150 of their 162 baseball games
through a local contract); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 13.
153
See Mason, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 56.
154
SCULLY, supra note 33, at 26; see generally Gary R. Roberts, The Legality of the
Exclusive Collective Sale of Intellectual Property Rights by Sports Leagues, 3 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 55 (2001).
155
Roberts, supra note 153, at 55 (explaining that “except for the one league-sold game
each week, the individual teams were not precluded from selling rights to all of the other
games. Thus, there was a pooling of rights for and exclusive collective selling of that one
weekly game, but the rights sold were not exclusive for all league games”).
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both the American Football League and the NFL had national
broadcast contracts.156 Then, in 1964, the NFL agreed to sell its
pooled broadcast rights to Columbia Broadcast System (“CBS”) in
a deal that generated over $1,000,000 in revenue per club—more
money than any club had ever earned by selling its rights
individually.157
The economic explanation for why individual clubs earned
more money from collectively selling broadcast rights is based on
a “pooling effect,” which means that by pooling broadcasts,
leagues eliminate interclub competition for broadcast rights,
driving up the price for television stations to purchase these
rights.158 Stated otherwise, “[i]n negotiating pooled television
rights . . . the League was able to keep bidding high for contracts
with broadcasting and other companies, while eliminating the
potential for clubs to compete against one another.”159 In doing so,
some have argued that pooling has even allowed sports clubs to
compete more effectively for the overall television programming
dollar.160
Today, collectively selling at least some sports broadcast rights
has become the industry standard based on the belief that
collectivizing certain broadcast rights benefits all clubs,
irrespective of market size,161 and based on a limited exemption
from antitrust law for joint conduct in this area, which is known as
the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961.162
156

SCULLY, supra note 33, at 27.
Mason, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 56.
158
COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 12–13; SCULLY, supra note 33, at 27.
159
Mason, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 56.
160
See, e.g., Chicago Bulls I, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 1992) (“As the NBA points
out, sports is a small fraction of all entertainment on TV, and basketball a small fraction
of sports televising.”).
161
See generally LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 83–84. But see FORT, supra
note 4, at 82–83 (noting the one exception might be New York markets where the New
York Yankees (MLB) slightly out-earned the New York Giants and Jets (NFL) in media
revenues based on the Yankees’ ability to capitalize on baseball’s structure that allows
for more local media in the broadcast mix).
162
See Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (“The antitrust laws . . . shall
not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or conducting the
organized profession team sports . . . by which any league of clubs . . . sells or otherwise
transfers all or any part of the rights of such league’s member clubs in the sponsored
telecasting of the games . . . engaged in or conducted by such clubs.”); see also
157
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Nevertheless, the divergent interests of individual clubs in
allocating broadcasting rights has often led to infighting about how
many games to broadcast on national-versus-local television, as
well as how to define local broadcast markets.163 Divergent
interests have even led to issues about whether clubs may extend
their local broadcast signals into competitor markets.164 For
example, shortly after the Chicago Bulls basketball club began to
broadcast their local games on WGN, a super station with
broadcast signals extending throughout the entire United States, six
years of litigation ensued between the Bulls and the rest of the
NBA clubs over the legitimacy of the Bulls’ broadcasting
practices.165 In this particular context, the Bulls’ interests were
completely disjointed from those of most NBA clubs, as the Bulls’
incentive was to maximize its personal broadcast revenue and
national fan base; on the other hand, the remaining NBA clubs
were concerned that the Bulls’ approach would devalue their
broadcasting revenues and comparative fan bases.166
COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 13 (“Congress, through the Sports Broadcasting Act
of 1961 and 1966, acceded to the NFL’s request and granted certain sports leagues a
limited antitrust exemption for purposes of negotiating league-wide, across-the-board
sponsored television broadcasting packages.”); Chicago Bulls I, 961 F.2d at 671 (“The
Sports Broadcasting Act is special interest legislation, a single-industry exception to a
law designed for the protection of the public.”).
163
See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984)
(“In certain areas of the country where two teams operate in close proximity, there is also
competition for . . . local television and local radio revenues.”); Team-By-Team Business
Previews, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 23, 2006, at 35 (explaining the desire
of the NBA’s Dallas Mavericks basketball team to broadcast games in competition with
the NBA’s San Antonio Spurs and Dallas Mavericks).
164
See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1098 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that NFL clubs
compete for “local broadcast revenues”).
165
See Chicago Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996); Chicago Bulls I, 961 F.2d at
669.
166
Chicago Bulls I, 961 F.2d at 669 (explaining that the national broadcast of 30
Chicago Bulls television games on the WGN superstation “is a boon . . . to the Bulls
owners . . . [b]ut it is a bane to the other clubs, which would prefer to have fans watch
their contests rather than tune in the Bulls, who, thanks to Michael Jordan and Scottie
Pippen . . . are the winningest and most popular team in the NBA.”).
It is interesting to note that in both Chicago Bulls I and Chicago Bulls II the defendant
NBA clubs sought to invoke the single entity defense; however, the facts in Chicago
Bulls I and Chicago Bulls II are almost opposite of Copperweld because the defendants in
the Chicago Bulls cases alleged that the plaintiff was also part of the single entity. It is
entirely nonsensical to conclude that a plaintiff and the defendants in a single lawsuit
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Further, the different perspectives amongst these clubs were
not grounded in mere philosophical ideology, but rather were
based on differences in disparate economic incentives.167 This
again signals a lack of “complete unity of interest.”168
D. Mixed-Mode Allocation of Licensing/Merchandising Fees
Licensing/merchandising fees, the fourth important revenue
stream, are fees from “reproducing an image, or portion thereof
[of] any copyrighted property for a fee to the rights holder.”169
Currently, each of the four premier sports leagues allocate
licensing/merchandising revenue by collectivizing individual club
trademark rights into a trust and then licensing those trademark
rights collectively through separately-formed “properties” arms.170
In 1963 the NFL became the first collection of sports clubs to
allocate licensing/merchandising rights in this manner when it
created NFL Properties as a joint venture to act on behalf of each
of the individual NFL clubs.171 By creating NFL Properties, the
NFL now requires that any commercial enterprise, seeking to use
any, or all, or some of the NFL club trademarks, license these
trademark rights collectively from NFL Properties, rather than
individually from specific football clubs.172
In recent years, licensing trademarks has become big business,
as the properties arms of MLB, the NBA, the NFL, and the NHL
could combine to form a single entity, given that a party would never seek to sue itself;
such a ruling “flies in the face of reason.” Village of Key Bicayne v. Tesaurus Holdings,
Inc., 761 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. App. 2000).
167
Cf. Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1983) (mentioning
conceivable competition amongst clubs for certain local broadcast revenues); Eric Fisher,
Is Liberty Media Right Fit for Braves?, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., May 1, 2006,
at 3 (providing one of many examples of media conglomerate ownership of sports clubs).
168
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
169
SCHAAF, supra note 149, at 235.
170
See generally id. at 236.
171
See American Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 942 (N.D.
Ill. 2007) (decision questionable on its merits); see also Roberts, supra note 153, at 59
(explaining that the precise legal steps of this transaction involved NFL clubs first
establishing a subsidiary corporation called “NFL Properties, Inc.,” and then all of the
NFL member clubs transferring virtually exclusive rights in their trademarks and logos of
the teams to an “NFL Trust” which NFL Properties managed).
172
Roberts, supra note 154, at 59.
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have generated substantial revenues.173 By operating licensing
departments collectively, properties arms of sports leagues build
economies of scale in licensing/merchandising and avoid
duplication of sales-staff resources.174 Additionally, clubs that
collectivize their trademarks enjoy a purported increase in profits
based on the “pooling effect,” because would-be buyers of
trademark licenses, which include both apparel companies and
league-wide sponsors, cannot pit one club against another.
Consequently, clubs are able to better compete to sell licenses
against other forms of entertainment.175
Nevertheless, the broad-based practice of collectivizing certain
licensing/merchandising rights is not firmly entrenched in the
structure of the mixed-mode system, but rather serves merely as a
loosely-bound feature of the system. For example, in the NHL,
despite clubs sharing equally in the revenues derived from
licensing club trademarks to apparel manufacturers, the Atlanta
Thrashers forego about $75,000 annually in private concessionstand revenue by not allowing their concessionaires to sell licensed
apparel of rival NHL clubs in their stadium.176 In addition, some
of the sports’ owners that had purchased their clubs before the

173

See id. at 59; SCHAAF, supra note 149, at 236 (stating the four premier sports
merchandise sellers in gross sales dollars are Major League Baseball Properties ($3.5
billion in gross sales in 1993), NFL Properties ($3.0 billion in gross sales in 1994), NBA
Properties ($2.5 billion in gross sales in 1993) and NHL Properties ($1.0 billion in gross
sales in 1993.)).
174
See Roberts, supra note 154, at 66 (explaining that collectivized selling of licensing
rights “[r]elieves each team of the burden of having to employ a staff of people with the
legal and business expertise to negotiate, draft, and implement [agreements]” and “can be
done more cheaply and efficiently by a central league staff of such experts with
substantial experience in this area”).
175
See Levin et al., in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 65 (“Competition for
the sports entertainment dollar, and for the sport fan’s attention, is increasingly intense.”);
cf. Broad. Music Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (finding cooperation amongst
competitors in arranging blanket licensing of certain copyrighted songs might be procompetitive within the scope of the greater entertainment market).
176
See Thrashers Offer to Swap Jerseys, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Jan. 30,
2006, at 30; see also John Lombardo, supra note 127, at 3 (explaining that even though
licensing rights are shared equally amongst NHL clubs, during the regular season
individual clubs keep concession revenues as private property, even where these revenues
involve the resale of licensed jerseys).
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forming of properties arms periodically attempt to reassert personal
property rights over their marks.177
In the past fifteen years, two sports clubs—the NFL’s Dallas
Cowboys and MLB’s New York Yankees—have litigated against
the full collectivization of club marks.178 Presumably, at the time
of conflict, either club could have threatened to leave their
respective league and reclaim their club marks as entirely private
property. However, no club could really make good on such a
threat without a guarantee that other clubs would follow.
Although both the Cowboys and Yankees eventually settled
their disputes, in each instance these disputes in-and-of themselves
amplify the strain of interests, as well as the lack of “complete
unity,” that persists even in the licensing/merchandising area of
sports business.179
E. Mixed-Mode Allocation of Internet/New Media Revenues
Finally, the newest form of property rights in professional
sports involves Internet/new media rights, which includes the
potential right to broadcast sports contests digitally over
broadband, the right to sell sports-related videos online, and the
right to control the trade names associated with Internet
properties.180
The number of American households with
broadband Internet access has risen from under 10 million in the
year 2000 to over 70 million today.181 As a result, according to
177

See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 15 (“Certain team owners may believe that
they can generate more revenue from local sponsors of their team . . . marks and logos
than their pro rata share of the revenue generated by an exclusive central league
marketing organization.”).
178
Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones prepared to challenge in court the NFL Trust and
the NFL’s pooling of all league and team marks and logos as a violation of antitrust laws.
Id. George Steinbrenner planned to do the same against MLB. Id. (citation omitted).
179
N.F.L. Settles with Cowboys, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1996, at 32; see also Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
180
See Eric Fisher, New Site First Step in NHL Digital Makeover, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTS BUS. J., Sept. 18, 2006, at 1, 31; John Lombardo & Eric Fisher, NBA Pumps Time,
Cash into Web, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Sept. 25, 2006, at 1, 60; New Media
Opens Door on New Revenues, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., May 1, 2006, at 20A
(Sports Emmy Awards).
181
See Predictions: What Lies Ahead on the Sports Media Landscape, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 27, 2006, at 40 (Graph: Tracking Growth of Broadband
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Sean McManus, president of CBS News and Sports, Internet/new
media revenues are “[t]he fastest growing segment” of sports
business.182 Specifically, for MLB, this business segment has
grown from $36 million in revenues in 2001 to an estimated $300
million in 2006.183
As with all new forms of property rights, Internet/new media
rights began in the dominion of individual clubs, with clubs hiring
their own staff of Internet marketing experts to help build their
respective brands.184 Recently, however, Internet/new media rights
have begun to shift to common property. In 1997, the NBA
became the first premier American league to shift Internet/new
media rights out of the realm of private property and into control
by the commons.185 Three years later, in the year 2000, MLB and
the NFL each adopted similar Internet/new media policies that
shifted control over these property rights into the common
sector.186 Very recently, the NHL attempted to implement a
similar policy, with clubs voting 25-3 in favor of collectivizing
Internet/new media rights (with one absence and one
abstention).187
Nevertheless, there still is not “complete unity of interest” with
respect to Internet/new media revenues. For example, Madison
Households) (also noting the increase in U.S. households that subscribe to the Internet
from just under 50 million in the year 2000 to over 75 million today).
182
New Media, supra note 179.
183
See Eric Fisher, supra note 119, at 1, 23–27.
184
See supra notes 117–79 and accompanying text; see also Rangers’ David Looks to
Past to Upgrade Team’s Web Site, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 16, 2006, at
12.
185
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 677.
186
Id.; see also Terry Lefton, NFL Taking Internet In-House: With No Big Offer,
League Thinks Long Term, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 23, 2006, at 1; Terry
Lefton & Eric Fisher, NFL Takes Time to Study Net Rights, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS
BUS. J., May 1, 2006, at 6.
187
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 1, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 Civ. 8455,
2007 WL 3254421 (S.D.N.Y 2007); see also Sara Stefanini, In Sports, Off-Court Battles
Range Over League Power, COMPETITION 360, Oct. 26, 2007. Even before the NHL
passed this formal policy, the NFL in September 2006 announced a role-out of the new
NHL.com site, which featured “a deep offering of video content, a sharply heightened
emphasis on fantasy gaming and social networking, and a constant showcase of
individual players.” Fisher, supra note 179, at 1, 31.
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Square Garden LP, the parent company of the New York Rangers,
recently filed a lawsuit against the NHL, arguing that “by seeking
to control the competitive [Internet/new media] activities of
independent businesses in ways that are not necessary to the
functioning of [the NHL] joint venture, the NHL has become an
illegal cartel.”188 The Rangers contended that “MSG today uses
[the Rangers website] as a competitive tool to generate and
maintain fan interest in the Rangers in competition with other NHL
teams.”189
Although the Rangers were ultimately denied their motion for
preliminary injunctions on other grounds,190 to the extent that the
Rangers seek to compete against other hockey clubs to build fan
interest, there simply, by definition, cannot be “complete unity of
interest” amongst NFL clubs.191

188

Complaint for Injunctive Relief at ¶ 6, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07
Civ. 8455, 2007 WL 3254421 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
189
Id. (emphasis added).
190
Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 Civ. 8455 (LAP), 2007 WL 3254421,
slip op. at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (finding the claim likely failed under the Rule of
Reason); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911) (explaining that joint
ventures reviewed under the Rule of Reason are permitted under this standard where their
pro-competitive benefits outweigh anticompetitive harm); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN &
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS 150 (3d ed. 1998) (“Because joint ventures have the potential of producing
benefits as well as costs, courts analyze them under the rule of reason, weighting the
economic efficiencies against the actual costs of the venture.”); see also id. at § 4.11.
191
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984); see also
Madison Square Garden, L.P., 2007 WL 3254421, slip op. at *8 (finding the NHL
operates as a “joint venture” and not a single entity). It is important to note that in
Madison Square Garden, much as in Chicago Bulls I and Chicago Bulls II, the defending
league has responded with the nonsensical argument that the club’s suit fails based on the
“single entity” defense. As explained above, see supra note 166, the single-entity
defense, even if otherwise appropriate, simply cannot apply where the plaintiff in a case
is part of the unit that the defendants argue composes a single entity, because the mere
fact that one member of the alleged single-entity unit is suing other members in itself
indicates lack of “complete unity of interest.” Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. A truly
independent party would never seek to sue itself; such an action “flies in the face of
reason.” Village of Key Bicayne v. Tesaurus Holdings, Inc., 761 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla.
App. 2000).
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CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty years, most American courts have
correctly concluded that premier American sports leagues are not
“single entities” because clubs in these leagues maintain too many
private property rights.192
Although one recent court has
challenged this notion,193 the overwhelming weight of evidence
indicates that the refusal to grant a “single entity” exemption to
premier American sports leagues is well justified.194
Upon reviewing the economic structure of the four premier
sports leagues that operate in a mixed-mode system, there is little
doubt that clubs in these leagues lack “complete unity of interest”
in each of the following areas: (1) individual gate receipts
(including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate proceeds; (3)
broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; and (5)
Internet/new media revenues.195 Moreover, when looking at these
leagues in the gestalt, none of them has anything close to the
“complete unity of interest” needed to invoke a “single entity”
defense.196
Presuming that federal courts continue to properly reject the
“single-entity” defense in the realm of premier American sports,
the business practices of each of the premier American sports
leagues will remain subject to Section One of the Sherman Act,
just like any other form of business joint venture. In other words,
beyond professional sports’ limited antitrust exemptions under the
Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961197 and the Curt Flood Act of

192

Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
See generally American Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans Saints, 496 F.Supp. 2d 941
(N.D. Ill. 2007).
194
Edelman, Single Entity Ruling, supra note 11, at 4, 12.
195
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771; see also supra notes 117–91 and accompanying text.
196
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771; see also Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d, 1091, 1099 (1st Cir.
1994) (“NFL member clubs compete in several ways off the field which itself tends to
show that the teams pursue diverse interests and thus are not single enterprises under
§1.”); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984)
(referencing competition amongst clubs more generally for fan support).
197
Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000); see also supra note 162 and
accompanying text.
193
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1998,198 premier American sports clubs would be allowed to reach
agreements with one another only if courts find these agreements
pro-competitive.199
Not only does denying the “single entity defense” conform to
the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in Copperweld, but this
conclusion is sound public policy. In recent years, premier
American sports clubs have become extraordinarily profitable
based on their unique property rights system. It would be a twisted
sense of irony if the unique property-rights system that has made
professional sports so profitable also were to provide them with a
loophole to avoid complying with antitrust principles.200
By rejecting the notion that premier American sports leagues
are “single entities,” federal courts importantly retain the ability to
regulate premier American sports clubs under Section One of the
Sherman Act. As a result, American consumers remain protected

198

15 U.S.C. § 26b (2000) (defining the status of baseball’s limited exemption from
antitrust law). The Congressional Record underlying the Curt Flood Act explains:
It is the purpose of this legislation to state that [MLB] players are
covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that MLB players will have the
same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes,
e.g., football and basketball players), along with a provision that
makes it clear that the passage of this Act does not change the
application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect
to any other person or entity.
Curt Flood Act of 1998 P.L. 105-297, §2, 112 Stat. 2824 (statement of Rep. Hyde). For
further discussion of the Curt Flood Act, as well as the case law underlying baseball’s
historic antitrust exemption, see Edelman, Minnesota Twins, supra note 42, at 47–54, 59–
62.
199
See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 189, at § 4.11 (explaining the Rule of Reason
in the context of joint ventures); see also Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911).
200
See N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257–58 (2d Cir. 1982)
(rejecting the application of the single entity defense by explaining that “[t]o tolerate such
a loophole would permit league members to escape antitrust responsibility for any
restraint entered into by them that would benefit their league or enhance their ability to
compete even though the benefit would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects. . . .
The sound and more just procedure is to judge the legality of [restraints amongst sports
clubs] according to well-recognized standards of our antitrust laws rather than permit
their exemption on the ground that since they in some measure strengthen the league
competitively as a ‘single economic entity,’ the combination’s anticompetitive effects
must be disregarded.”).
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against the risks of anti-competitive conduct within the
professional sports industry.201

201
See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 189, at § 4.11 (explaining the Rule of Reason
in the context of joint ventures); see also Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 31; L.A. Mem’l
Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1390 (“Of course, the singular nature of the NFL will
need to be accounted for in discussing the reasonableness of the restriction . . . but it is
not enough to preclude § 1 scrutiny.”); N. Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1257
(explaining that denying the single-entity defense requires that sports leagues’ conduct
undergo review under the Rule of Reason).

